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Abstract
Defensive forecasting is a method of transforming laws of probability
(stated in game-theoretic terms as strategies for Sceptic) into forecast-
ing algorithms. There are two known varieties of defensive forecasting:
“continuous”, in which Sceptic’s moves are assumed to depend on the
forecasts in a (semi)continuous manner and which produces deterministic
forecasts, and “randomized”, in which the dependence of Sceptic’s moves
on the forecasts is arbitrary and Forecaster’s moves are allowed to be ran-
domized. This note shows that the randomized variety can be obtained
from the continuous variety by smearing Sceptic’s moves to make them
continuous.
New as compared to version 1 (17 August 2007) of this re-
port: The assumption of version 1 that the outcome space Ω is finite is
relaxed, and now it is only assumed to be compact. In the case where Ω
is finite, it is shown that Forecaster can choose his randomized forecasts
concentrated on a finite set of cardinality at most |Ω|.
1 Introduction
The continuous variety of defensive forecasting was essentially introduced by
Levin [9], but was later rediscovered by Kakade and Foster [7] and Takemura et
al. [16].
The randomized variety was introduced (in the case of von Mises’s version of
the game-theoretic approach to probability) by Foster and Vohra [5] and further
developed by, among others, Sandroni et al. [11]; these papers, however, were
only concerned with asymptotic calibration. Non-asymptotic versions of the
randomized variety were proposed by Sandroni [10] (based on standard measure-
theoretic probability) and Vovk and Shafer [15] (based on game-theoretic prob-
ability). Kakade and Foster [7] noticed that some calibration results require
very little randomization (this will be an important aspect of our Theorem 2).
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This note states two simple results about defensive forecasting, Theorem
1 about the continuous variety and Theorem 2 about the randomized variety.
The proof of Theorem 2 is obtained from the proof of Theorem 1 by blurring
Sceptic’s moves.
In our informal discussions we will be assuming that the set Ω of all possible
outcomes is finite, although we will try to make mathematical statements as
general as possible. The reader who is only interested in the main ideas might
choose to specialize Theorems 1 and 2 and their proofs to the case of finite Ω.
2 Continuous defensive forecasting
Let Ω (the outcome space) be a compact (i.e., a compact Hausdorff topological
space) equipped with the Baire σ-algebra and P(Ω) be the set of all probabil-
ity measures on Ω equipped with the standard topology (the weak∗ topology
on P(Ω) identified with a subset of C(Ω)′ by a Riesz representation theorem,
Theorem 7.4.1 in [3]; this is also known as the topology of weak convergence
in the case of metrizable Ω). The subset Pfin(Ω) of P(Ω) consists of all prob-
ability measures in P(Ω) concentrated on a finite subset of Ω. If Ω is finite,
P(Ω) = Pfin(Ω) can be identified with an (|Ω| − 1)-dimensional simplex (see
below) in Euclidean space equipped with the standard Euclidean distance and
topology.
Theorem 1 will be a statement about the following perfect-information game
involving three players:
Continuous game
Players: Sceptic, Forecaster, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Sceptic announces a function Sn : Ω× P(Ω)→ R
which is lower semicontinuous in the second argument
and satisfies
∫
Ω
Sn(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ Pfin(Ω).
Forecaster announces pn ∈ P(Ω).
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(ωn, pn).
Winner: Forecaster wins if Sceptic’s capital Kn stays bounded.
(For p ∈ Pfin(Ω), the integral
∫
Ω Sn(ω, p)p(dω) is interpreted as a sum, and so
Sn(ω, p) is not required to be measurable in ω.)
Intuitively, on each round of the game Forecaster is asked to give a proba-
bility forecast pn for the outcome ωn to be chosen by Reality. Sceptic is testing
the forecasts pn by gambling against them. Forecaster wins the game if Sceptic
does not detect serious disagreement between Forecaster and Reality.
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The continuous game is stated here in the form that makes Theorem 1
as strong as possible. In typical applications in prediction with expert ad-
vice and algorithmic information theory, Sceptic’s move Sn(ω, p) is lower semi-
continuous jointly in (ω, p) ∈ Ω × P(Ω) and measurable in ω; the condition∫
Ω Sn(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0 is required to hold for all p ∈ P(Ω). Furthermore, there
is an important restriction imposed on Sceptic: he must choose Sn so that his
capital remains nonnegative (Kn ≥ 0) no matter how the other players move
(in particular, the function Sn must be bounded below). Theorem 1, however,
does not depend on these further assumptions.
The following result was stated (in different terms) by Levin [9].
Theorem 1 Forecaster has a strategy in the continuous game that guarantees
K0 ≥ K1 ≥ K2 ≥ · · · .
In other words, not only Sceptic does not detect serious disagreement between
Forecaster and Reality, he does not detect any disagreement at all.
We will reproduce Levin’s original proof, as detailed by Ga´cs [6], Section 5;
for a different proof (essentially a reference to Ky Fan’s minimax theorem, [1],
Theorem 11.4) under stronger assumptions, see [14], Section 3.
A set v1, . . . , vM of points in a Euclidean (or topological vector) space is
affinely independent if, for all real numbers λ1, . . . , λM ,
M∑
m=1
λmvm = 0 and
M∑
m=1
λm = 0 imply λ1 = · · · = λM = 0.
The convex hull of such v1, . . . , vM , denoted co(v1, . . . , vM ), is called a simplex
or, more fully, an (M − 1)-dimensional simplex. The proof of Theorem 1 will
use the following result due to Knaster, Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz ([8]; see
also [1], Theorem 11.2).
KKM Theorem Let F1, . . . , FM be closed subsets of a simplex co(v1, . . . , vM ).
Suppose that for all 1 ≤ k ≤M and 1 ≤ m1 ≤ · · · ≤ mk ≤M we have
co (vm1 , . . . , vmk) ⊆ Fm1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fmk .
Then F1 ∩ · · · ∩ FM 6= ∅.
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix a round n of the game and set S := Sn. For every
ω ∈ Ω, let Fω be the closed set
Fω := {p ∈ P(Ω) |S(ω, p) ≤ 0} .
It suffices to show that for every finite set of points ω1, . . . , ωM we have
Fω1 ∩ · · · ∩ FωM 6= ∅. (1)
Indeed, the compactness of Ω implies the compactness of P(Ω) (combine
Alaoglu’s theorem, Problem 9 in Section 6.1 of [3], with the weak∗ closeness
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of P(Ω) in C(Ω)′, following from [3], Theorems 7.1.5 and 2.6.3). Therefore, if
every finite subset of the family {Fω |ω ∈ Ω} of closed sets has a non-empty
intersection, then the whole family has a nonempty intersection, and any of the
measures in this intersection can be taken as pn.
To show (1), let P(ω1, . . . , ωM ) be the set of probability measures concen-
trated on {ω1, . . . , ωM}. If p ∈ P(ω1, . . . , ωM ), the inequality
∫
S(ω, p)p(dω) ≤
0 implies S(ωm, p) ≤ 0 for some m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Hence P(ω1, . . . , ωM ) ⊆
Fω1 ∪ · · · ∪FωM , and the same holds for every subset of the indices {1, . . . ,M}.
The KKM theorem now implies (1).
3 Randomized defensive forecasting
Let Pfin(P(Ω)) be the set of all probability measures on P(Ω) concentrated on
a finite subset of P(Ω). For each P ∈ Pfin(P(Ω)), let D(P ) ⊆ P(Ω) be the
smallest finite set in P(Ω) of P -probability one.
Our result about randomized defensive forecasting concerns the following
perfect-information game involving four players:
Randomized game
Players: Sceptic, Forecaster, Reality, Random Number Generator
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
F0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Sceptic announces a function Sn : Ω× P(Ω)→ R
which is continuous in the first argument ω ∈ Ω
and satisfies
∫
Ω
Sn(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ P(Ω).
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ Pfin(P(Ω)).
Reality announces ωn ∈ Ω.
Forecaster announces a function fn : P(Ω)→ R such that
∫
P(Ω) fndPn ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ D(Pn).
Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(ωn, pn).
Fn := Fn−1 + fn(pn).
Restriction on Sceptic: Sceptic must choose Sn (continuous, and so Baire
measurable, in its first argument) so that his capital remains nonnegative
(Kn ≥ 0) no matter how the other players move (in particular, the function
Sn must be bounded below).
Restriction on Forecaster: Forecaster must choose his moves so that his
capital remains nonnegative (Fn ≥ 0) no matter how the other players
move.
Winner: Forecaster wins if either (i) his capital Fn tends to infinity or (ii)
Sceptic’s capital Kn stays bounded.
4
(Since
∫
P(Ω)
fndPn =
∫
D(Pn)
fndPn is a sum, its existence does not depend on
the measurability of fn. However, by the Tietze–Urysohn theorem, Theorem
2.1.8 in [4], fn can be chosen continuous and, therefore, Baire measurable; the
Tietze–Urysohn theorem is applicable since every compact is normal, [4], The-
orem 3.1.9.)
Forecaster is now allowed to randomize, and it is Random Number Gen-
erator who picks the actual forecast pn from Forecaster’s randomized forecast
Pn. As before, Sceptic is testing the forecasts pn by gambling against them.
To make sure that Random Number Generator performs his duty of producing
random-looking pn, Forecaster is allowed to gamble against Random Number
Generator’s choices. Forecaster wins the game if he either discredits Random
Number Generator or Sceptic does not detect serious disagreement between the
forecasts and the outcomes.
In the case of finite Ω, the only restriction on Sceptic’s move Sn is∫
Ω
Sn(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0, ∀p ∈ P(Ω). We will see that in this case Theorem
2 will remain true even if fn is required to be a linear function on the simplex
P(Ω).
The following is the randomized counterpart of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For any ǫ > 0 and any sequence A1,A2, . . . of open covers of
the outcome space Ω, Forecaster has a strategy in the randomized game that
guarantees:
• Kn ≤ (1 + ǫ)Fn for each n;
• D(Pn) lies completely in one element of An;
• |D(Pn)| ≤ |Ω|.
The last item, |D(Pn)| ≤ |Ω|, is of interest only in the case of finite Ω: it holds
trivially when Ω is infinite.
Before discussing the intuition behind Theorem 2 we restate the second
item in a more intuitive form assuming that Ω is finite and dist is the Euclidean
distance on the simplex P(Ω). (More generally, Ω can be assumed a compact
metric space and dist be, e.g., the Prokhorov metric on P(Ω); see, e.g., [2],
Appendix III, Theorem 6.)
Corollary 1 Suppose Ω is finite (or a metric compact). For any ǫ > 0 and
any sequence ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . of positive real numbers, Forecaster has a strategy in the
randomized game that guarantees:
• Kn ≤ (1 + ǫ)Fn for each n;
• the diameter of D(Pn) is at most ǫn:
diamD(Pn) := sup
p,q∈D(Pn)
dist(p, q) = max
p,q∈D(Pn)
dist(p, q) ≤ ǫn;
• |D(Pn)| ≤ |Ω|.
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The condition Kn ≤ (1 + ǫ)Fn says that Forecaster can guarantee Fn ≥ Kn
to any approximation required, i.e., every pound gained by Sceptic can be at-
tributed to the poor performance of Random Number Generator. The condition
diamD(Pn) ≤ ǫn shows that already a tiny amount of randomization is suffi-
cient; as already mentioned, a similar observation was made by Kakade and
Foster [7].
Proof of Theorem 2: We will repeatedly use the fact that P(Ω) is paracom-
pact ([4], Theorem 5.1.1). The stronger condition that P(Ω) is compact will
only be used in a reference to Theorem 1.
Fix a round n of the game. Let δ > 0 be a small constant (how small will
be determined later). For each p ∈ P(Ω) set
Ap :=
{
q ∈ P(Ω) |
∫
Ω
Sn(ω, p)q(dω) < δ
}
; (2)
notice that p ∈ Ap and that Ap is an open set. Let B be any open star refinement
of An (it exists by [4], Theorem 5.1.12, (i) and (iii)), let C be any locally finite
open refinement of B (it exists by the definition of paracompactness), and let
Bp be the intersection of Ap with an arbitrary element of C containing p. Notice
that the Bp form an open cover of P(Ω). If Ω is finite, replace {Bp}p∈P(Ω) by its
open shrinking of order |Ω|−1 (it exists by the Dowker theorem, Theorem 7.2.4
in [4], since Ω is normal, Theorem 3.1.9 in [4], and dim(P(Ω)) = |Ω| − 1, [4],
Theorem 7.3.19); we will use the same notation {Bp}p∈P(Ω) for the shrinking.
Let {fs}s∈S be a locally finite partition of unity subordinated to the open cover
{Bp}p∈P(Ω) ([4], Theorem 5.1.9). For each s ∈ S choose a ps ∈ P(Ω) such that
{p | fs(p) > 0} ⊆ Bps . Set, for ω ∈ Ω and p ∈ P(Ω),
S∗(ω, p) :=
∑
s∈S
Sn(ω, ps)fs(p)
(notice that only a finite number of addends are non-zero, so the sum is well-
defined).
In the previous section we were considering Sceptic’s moves Sn(ω, p) lower
semicontinuous in p and satisfying
∫
Ω
Sn(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ Pfin(Ω). It
is clear that S∗(ω, p) is even continuous in p; let us check that it almost satisfies∫
Ω S
∗(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ P(Ω). We have:
∫
Ω
S∗(ω, p)p(dω) =
∫
Ω
∑
s∈Sp
Sn(ω, ps)fs(p)p(dω)
=
∑
s∈Sp
∫
Ω
Sn(ω, ps)p(dω)fs(p) ≤
∑
s∈Sp
δfs(p) = δ, (3)
where Sp is the finite set of all s for which fs(p) > 0; the inequality in (3) uses the
fact that p ∈ Bps ⊆ Aps and the definition (2). Therefore,
∫
Ω S(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ 0
for all p, where S := S∗ − δ. Applying to S the argument given in the proof of
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Theorem 1, we can see that there exists p∗ ∈ P(Ω) satisfying S(ω, p∗) ≤ 0, i.e.,
S∗(ω, p∗) ≤ δ, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Make Forecaster select Pn concentrated on the ps with positive fs(p
∗) and
assigning weight fs(p
∗) to each of these ps. This will ensure that Pn is concen-
trated on a finite subset, D(Pn), of an element of An and that |D(Pn)| ≤ |Ω|.
The rest of the proof proceeds similarly to the proof of Theorem 3 in [15].
Let δ be ǫ2−n or less. This will ensure∫
Sn(ω, p)Pn(dp) ≤ ǫ2
−n (4)
for all ω ∈ Ω. Let Forecaster’s strategy further tell him to use as his second
move the function fn given by
fn(p) :=
1
1 + ǫ
(
Sn(ωn, p)− ǫ2
−n
)
(5)
for p ∈ D(Pn) and defined arbitrarily for p /∈ D(Pn). The condition
∫
fndPn ≤ 0
is then guaranteed by (4).
It remains to check Kn ≤ (1 + ǫ)Fn (this will also establish that Fn is never
negative). This can be done by a formal calculation (as in the proof of Theorem
3 in [15]), but I prefer the following intuitive picture. We would like Forecaster
to use fn(p) := Sn(ωn, p)− ǫ2−n (for p ∈ D(Pn)) as his second move; this would
always keep his capital Fn above Kn−ǫ. To make sure that Fn is never negative,
Forecaster would have to start with initial capital F0 = 1+ ǫ, which, moreover,
would lead to Fn ≥ Kn, ∀n; our protocol, however, requires F0 = 1. Therefore,
Forecaster’s strategy has to be scaled down to the initial capital 1, leading to
(5); Fn ≥ Kn becomes (1 + ǫ)Fn ≥ Kn. (Scaling down a strategy to a smaller
initial capital means that the player multiplies the strategy’s moves by the same
factor as he has multiplied the initial capital, thus assuring that the capital on
succeeding rounds is also multiplied by this factor.)
Corollary 2 Forecaster has a winning strategy in the randomized game.
Proof We are required to show that for every legal strategy S for Forecaster,
we can construct another legal strategy S∗ such that whenever S’s capital is
unbounded, S∗’s tends to infinity. I will reproduce a simple construction (which
I learned from Shen) given in [15], the proof of Theorem 3. (For a more efficient,
in certain respects, construction see [12], Lemma 3.1; an even better construction
has been recently devised by Vereshchagin and Shen.)
We choose some number larger than 1, say 2. Starting, as the game requires,
with initial capital 1 for Forecaster, we have him play S until its capital exceeds
2. Then he sets aside 1 of this capital and continues with a rescaled version
of S, scaled down to the reduced capital. When the capital again exceeds 2,
he again sets aside 1, and so forth. The money set aside, which is part of the
capital earned by this strategy, grows without bound.
Theorem 2 imposes a condition of continuity on Sceptic’s move Sn whereas
Theorem 1 only requires lower semicontinuity (in a different argument). A
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natural question is whether we can relax the former condition. The key point
in the proof of Theorem 2 where the continuity of Sn in ω is used is the claim
that the set (2) is open. This claim will still be true if Sn is only required to be
upper semicontinuous in ω, at least when Ω is a metric compact. We did not
pursue this generalization since it can be deduced from Theorem 2 as a corollary
(Corollary 3 below).
Let us say that a real-valued function f on Ω is strongly upper semicontinuous
if there is a monotonic sequence of bounded above real-valued functions f1 ≥
f2 ≥ · · · on Ω that converges to f everywhere. For metric compacts, this
requirement coincides with upper semicontinuity ([4], Problems 1.7.15(c) and
3.12.23(g)), but in general it is stronger ([4], Problems 1.7.14(a), 1.7.15(c), and
3.12.23(g)).
Corollary 3 Theorem 2 will continue to hold if the condition that Sn(ω, p) be
continuous in ω ∈ Ω in the randomized game is relaxed to the condition that
Sn(ω, p) be strongly upper semicontinuous in ω ∈ Ω.
Proof The proof proceeds similarly to the end of the proof of Theorem 2. Let ǫ′
be a small positive constant (we will need (1+ǫ′)2 ≤ 1+ǫ). Fix, for a moment, a
round n of the game. By the monotone convergence theorem and the definition
of strong upper semicontinuity, there exists a function S′n : Ω×P(Ω)→ R such
that S′n ≥ Sn, S
′
n(ω, p) is continuous in ω ∈ Ω, and
∫
Ω S
′
n(ω, p)p(dω) ≤ ǫ
′2−n
for all p ∈ P(Ω). Theorem 2 is applicable to Sceptic’s move
S′′n :=
1
1 + ǫ′
(
S′n − ǫ
′2−n
)
on round n, for each n = 1, 2, . . ., and it asserts the existence of a strategy for
Forecaster ensuring
Kn ≤ K
′
n ≤ (1 + ǫ
′)K′′n ≤ (1 + ǫ
′)2Fn,
where K′ is the capital corresponding to the strategy S′ (formally, K′n := 1 +∑n
i=1 S
′
i(ωi, pi)) and K
′′ is the capital corresponding to the strategy S′′.
Theorem 2 is a general form of Theorem 5 in [15] (that theorem is not part
of the journal version). This note is self-contained from the mathematical point
of view, but for further motivation behind Theorem 2 the reader is referred to
[15].
4 Discussion
This note assumes that the outcome space Ω is a compact. This assumption
is not as restrictive as it seems since a wide range of topological spaces have
compactifications that are still “nice” topological spaces (cf. [13], the subsection
on pp. 4–5). It appears that implications of this fact for prediction with expert
advice (see, e.g., [14]) deserve to be explored.
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